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Abstract
The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens’ preferences
for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment
performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its
uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people with ill health etc.), and nationality
of beneﬁciary. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those
who deem beneﬁts too low, and negative otherwise. However, even those who state
that government should reduce income inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average.
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below the current value of 25%. Thus, the present Swiss welfare state does not appear
sustainable.
Keywords: Income redistribution, welfare state, sustainability, preferences, will-
ingness to pay, discrete choice experiments
JEL classiﬁcation: C35, C93, D63, H29
∗Corresponding author: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032 Zurich,
Switzerland, Tel. +41-44-634 06 09, Fax: +41-44-634 49 87, E-mail: ilja.neustadt@soi.uzh.ch
†Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,
E-mail: pzweifel@soi.uzh.ch
1
1 Introduction
The sustainability of the welfare state is a hotly debated topic between politicians and
interest groups. The economists’ contribution to the debate traditionally has been to
analyze the eﬀects of redistributive policies on employment, output, and growth. However,
in full cognition of these eﬀects, a majority of citizens may still exhibit willingness to pay
(WTP) for more redistribution of income. Conversely, its WTP may be negative even
in a situation where these side eﬀects of redistribution are unimportant. Ultimately, the
sustainability of the welfare state therefore hinges on citizens’ WTP. Through a Discrete
Choice experiment (DCE), this paper seeks to determine not only the desired amount of
redistribution but also to test several hypotheses concerning the determinants of this WTP.
The data come from a DCE performed in the fall of 2008 and involving more than 900
Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants, which will be discussed in Section 2 below. One strand relates the mea-
sured amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral factors. Examples
are Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009). However,
the observed amount of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between demand
and supply, with supply governed by a country’s political institutions and processes. This
classical identiﬁcation problem would have to be addressed in order to make inferences
about citizens’ preferences for redistribution. A second strand of research, exempliﬁed by
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to measure
attitudes towards redistribution. The problem with this approach is its failure to impose
a budget constraint. It therefore cannot predict actual decision making (e.g. voting at the
polls), where citizens take the consequences in terms of their own income and wealth into
account. A third approach seeks to solve this problem through Contingent Valuation (CV)
experiments [see e.g. Boeri et al. (2001)1, Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini (2002)].
1Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also perform CV experiments that
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The weakness of the CV approach is that it holds all the attributes of the good in question
constant, varying its price only. One would want to vary other attributes of redistribution
besides its tax price, viz. its uses (for health, old age, etc.) and the type of beneﬁciary
(foreigner, national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows to measure preferences uncontaminated by supply
inﬂuences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it does so in
a realistic way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all attributes are
allowed to vary.
There are two contributions whose methodology is similar to the one adopted in this
paper. One is by Andreoni and Miller (2002), who test the consistency of altruistic re-
vealed preferences in a dictatorship experiment, varying an implicit price. Their method
of inferring preferences through estimating WTP values is close to this paper. The other
is by Kuhn (2005), who asked Swiss respondents to estimate wages earned by diﬀerent
professions as well as to indicate the wages they deemed fair. The diﬀerence between these
two values was then used as an indicator of the demand for redistribution. On average,
preferences were for the wages of high-earning professions such as lawyers, physicians, and
federal ministers to be reduced by 10 percent while those of low-income groups, to be in-
creased by some 5 percent. Interestingly, such a redistributive scheme would roughly result
in budget balance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its ﬁrst part concerns general
determinants of the demand for redistribution and the second, attitudes towards reduction
of inequality as determinants of preferences for redistribution. Section 3 presents a general
description of the method of DCEs as well as the design of the present experiment. The
descriptive statistics of the experiment follow in Section 4, and hypothesis tests, in Section
5. Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes with an assessment of the sustainability
impose an explicit trade-oﬀ between income and social insurance coverage on respondents. They ﬁnd that
people oppose an extension of the welfare state, with conﬂicts between young and old, rich and poor, and
insiders and outsiders creating signiﬁcant hurdles to welfare reform.
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of the Swiss welfare state.
2 Literature Review and Statement of Hypotheses
This section ﬁrst presents research that deﬁnes the general background of this paper and
then moves on to contributions that lead to a set of speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested.
2.1 General Determinants of the Demand for Income Redistri-
bution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide
set of factors that can be categorized as economic, political, and behavioral determinants
of the demand for income redistribution.
2.1.1 Economic Determinants
The simplest framework for the analysis of purely economic determinants is provided by a
model focusing on current economic well-being, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981) [RRMR model]. This model
assumes non-altruistic utility-maximizing individuals diﬀerentiated by their income levels
only. The government pays a lump-sum transfer to all citizens, ﬁnanced by a linear uniform
income tax. Individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation and transfers while
those with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political equilibrium, the majority
of voters supports a positive tax rate corresponding to the value desired by the median
voter2. The model’s prediction is that the larger the gap between the mean and the median
income, the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) ﬁnd some supporting evidence. Fur-
2The median voter’s income is assumed to be below the mean. This assumption is satisﬁed for most
economies.
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thermore, Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four
EU countries, shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redis-
tribution. On the other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez
(1999) fail to ﬁnd supporting evidence for this model. Moreover, Neustadt and Zweifel
(2009) relate willingness to pay (WTP) for income redistribution elicited from a Discrete
Choice Experiment (DCE, see Section 3.1 for details) to measures of economic well-being.
WTP values are negatively related to income and education, contradicting the RRMR
model.
Another economic explanation is the ”Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypoth-
esis, suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) as the ’tunnel eﬀect’ and more recently
reformulated by Benabou and Ok (2001). It extends the RRMR model by introducing indi-
viduals’ expectations, based on their observations regarding the income mobility of others
in society. Expected upward mobility may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s
enthusiasm for income redistribution.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) who, using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people who
can expect high future income oppose redistribution3. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use prob-
abilistic expectations data to show that individuals with a suﬃciently large chance of
occupational upward mobility exhibit a lower demand for redistribution; conversely, those
with a suﬃciently large risk of occupational downward mobility opt for more redistribu-
tion. Checchi and Filippin (2004), testing the POUM hypothesis by means of a within-
subjects experiment, ﬁnd corroborating evidence under several alternative speciﬁcations.
According to Guillaud (2008), however, individuals who subjectively experienced upward
mobility over ten years tend to be more (rather than less) supportive of redistributive poli-
3The ’tunnel eﬀect’ also works in the opposite direction, causing forward-looking agents with high
incomes but downward mobility expectations to be in favor of redistribution. This prediction is conﬁrmed
by Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) using a data set from Russia. Furthermore, Molna´r and Kapita´ny (2006a;
2006b) show that individuals who lack clear expectations about their future income favor redistribution
even more than those with negative but clear expectations.
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cies. Moreover, upward intergenerational mobility in occupational prestige goes along with
more positive rather than negative attitude towards redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) examine the empirical evidence for the United States and brieﬂy across countries,
concluding that social mobility (if measured as the change in the occupational prestige)
does decrease demand for redistribution once sociodemographic (age, gender, race) and
socioeconomic characteristics (income, education) are controlled for. In their DCE-based
study, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) relate preferences for redistribution to mobility. They
ﬁnd partial empirical support for the POUM hypothesis.
Another economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that pref-
erences for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as a demand for insurance
by risk-averse individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know
their endowment as well as their future position in society [’veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls
(1999)], they are predicted to exhibit positive WTP for an income transfer from more fa-
vorable future states to less favorable ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted
as reﬂecting this hypothetical demand for insurance. Beck (1994) investigates individual
behavior under the ’veil of ignorance’ in an experiment. By placing participants in a hypo-
thetical society with random diﬀerences in income, represented by lotteries, he is able to
derive the desired amount of income redistribution. Individuals indeed display risk aver-
sion, albeit not of the extreme kind implied by the Rawlsian maximin rule4. Furthermore,
they show no preference for income redistribution in excess of what can be explained by
risk aversion.
2.1.2 Political Determinants
As to the political determinants of the demand for income redistribution, the literature
[Persson and Tabellini (2000; 2003); Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)]
predicts that proportional representation tends towards universal programs beneﬁtting var-
ious groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results
4The Rawlsian maximin rule uses the maximum improvement of the individual with minimum initial
wealth as the sole criterion.
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in targeted ”pork barrel” programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd supporting empirical
evidence in that countries with proportional representation have GDP shares of govern-
ment expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 percentage points higher than countries with
majority rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) present weak evidence of a positive corre-
lation between the degree of proportional representation and the transfer share in GDP in
OECD countries. Additional political determinants of redistribution include two-party vs.
multiparty system, presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs. representative
democracy, with two-party systems, presidential, and direct democracies all predicted to
induce less public redistribution. In order to sketch the institutional background of the
DCE described in Section 3.2, Switzerland can be described as follows. It has a high degree
of proportional representation and a parliamentary democracy. Its distinguishing feature,
however, is its extensive direct democratic control in the guise of popular initiatives and
referenda. This might serve to limit public welfare spending while enforcing eﬃciency in
redistribution [cf. Feld et al. (2007)].
2.1.3 Behavioral Determinants
The mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants of preferences for
redistribution calls for a detailed analysis of their behavioral determinants. In particular,
beliefs have been at the center of attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and
Angeletos (2005), who develop a model where society’s belief whether eﬀort or luck deter-
mines economic success gives rise to multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria. Benabou and Tirole
(2006) propose a model for the emergence and persistence of such collective beliefs. More-
over, beliefs can be seen as a source of altruistic preferences and inequality aversion [see
Section 2.2]. On the empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence in line with Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that beliefs about the role of luck in determining economic
success are an important determinant of the demand for redistribution. She also considers
the eﬀects of incentives. If eﬀort determines income, then an increased income tax rate
causes an output loss due to its eﬀect on incentives. This consideration is hypothesized to
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qualify the link between beliefs and the demand for redistribution. However, the data fail
to support this hypothesis.
2.2 Attitudes towards Reduction of Inequality and Demand for
Income Redistribution
While the POUM hypothesis suggests less redistribution than predicted by the RRMR
model, the assumption of altruistic preferences can lead to the opposite prediction. In
fact, if individuals care also about the utility of others, one might expect more redistribu-
tion than predicted by the conventional RRMR model. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a
review of several models of social preferences, in particular, altruism, envy, inequality aver-
sion, fairness, and reciprocity. Here, we focus on inequality aversion to derive hypotheses
relating it to demand for income redistribution. In a simple model of inequality aversion,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)] assume that individuals feel envy if their incomes are below that
of others (disadvantageous inequality, see second term of eq. (1)), but they feel altruistic
when their income exceeds it (advantageous inequality, see third term of eq. (1)). An
individual 푖’s utility function is assumed to have the form
푈푖(푥1, . . . , 푥푁) = 푥푖 −
훼푖
푁 − 1
∑
푗 ∕=푖
max {푥푗 − 푥푖, 0} −
훽푖
푁 − 1
∑
푗 ∕=푖
max {푥푖 − 푥푗 , 0} (1)
with 0 ≤ 훽푖 ≤ 훼푖 (the disutility from disadvantageous inequality is assumed to exceed
that from advantageous inequality) and 훽푖 ≤ 1 (individuals are not willing to waste money
in order to avoid being signiﬁcantly richer than others). Here 푥푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 푁 , denotes
individual 푘’s income, 훼푖, the marginal disutility from disadvantageous inequality, and 훽푖,
the marginal disutility from advantageous inequality. In this model, the decisive median
voter demands more redistribution than in the conventional RRMR model. First, she
has disutility from being richer than those with income 푥푗 < 푥푖. Second, she has even
more disutility from being poorer than those with income 푥푗 > 푥푖. Thus, in a political
equilibrium, larger values of 훼푖, 훽푖 (higher level of inequality aversion) lead to a higher
demand for redistribution compared to that predicted by the RRMR model.
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Based on the assumption of inequality aversion, we formulate two hypotheses to be
tested in Section 5.2. The ﬁrst assumes that citizens with higher inequality aversion tend
to deem the current level of social beneﬁts to be too low, while those with lower inequality
aversion deem it too high or just suﬃcient. Thus, the former are predicted to exhibit a
positive WTP for redistribution while the latter, a negative one. The second hypothesis
is based on the consideration that voters exhibiting inequality aversion tend to support
the view that the government should reduce the income gap between rich and poor. Con-
sequently, respondents who state that the reduction of the income gap is a task of the
government are expected to exhibit a positive WTP for redistribution.
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(A) negative if the currently provided level of social beneﬁts is considered too high,
(B) negative but less so than in (A) if the currently provided level of social beneﬁts
is considered to be just suﬃcient,
(C) positive if the currently provided level of social beneﬁts is considered too low.
Hypothesis 2: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(a) negative if the individual thinks that the government should not reduce the income
gap between the poor and the rich,
(b) positive if the individual thinks that the government should reduce the income gap
between the poor and the rich.
3 Discrete Choice Experiments
3.1 Theoretical Foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ preferences
for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction to classical
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Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals
to express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a
DCE, respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical
alternatives deﬁned by their attributes including a price. By varying the levels of attributes,
diﬀerent product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always choose the
alternative with the highest utility. From the observed choices, the researcher can infer
the utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from the New
Demand Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere, Hensher
and Swait (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain
situation or product is described in detail, and respondents are asked to indicate their
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for this ﬁxed product. Only its price attribute is
varied, while in Conjoint Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making
it a multi-attribute valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes
the product in less detail than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product
varieties by varying the levels of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-
oﬀs among attributes can be explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes
estimated separately (see below). Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less
likely than in CV with its exclusive emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior.
Finally, biases that easily occur when individuals are directly asked about their WTP are
less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan (2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly
impose the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of
income used to ﬁnance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultane-
ously choose this share and hence the ’size of the pie’ and the ’slices of the pie’ devoted
to diﬀerent types of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.; see Exhibits No. 1 to 3 in
Appendix). Thus, trade-oﬀs among diﬀerent attributes of the redistribution plan can be
calculated to assess the relative importance of the respective redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
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Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974; 1981; 2001)]. Individual 푖 values alter-
native 푗 according to the utility 푉푖푗 attained, which is given by
푉푖푗 = 푣푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖, 휀푖푗). (2)
Here, 푣푖(⋅) denotes 푖’s indirect utility function, 푎푗 , the amount of attributes associated with
alternative 푗, and 푝푗 , price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by 푦푖 and 푠푖, respectively. Finally, 휀푖푗 denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering 푣푖, imparting
a stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split
into a systematic component 푤(⋅) and a stochastic one,
푉푖푗 = 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗.
A utility-maximizing individual 푖 will prefer alternative 푗 to alternative 푙 if and only if
푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗. (3)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability 푃푖푗 of individual 푖 choosing
alternative 푗 rather than alternative 푙 can be estimated, with
푃푖푗 = Prob [푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗 ] (4)
= Prob [휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)] . (5)
Thus, the probability of choosing 푗 amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
diﬀerence 푤푖[푗] − 푤푖[푙] dominating the ’noise’, 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 . By the central limit theorem,
the error terms {휀푖푙, 휀푖푗} can be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variances 휎2푙 and 휎
2
푗 as well as covariance 휎푙푗 . Under these assumptions, 휑푖푗 := 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 is
also normally distributed with mean zero and variance 휎2 := Var[휑푖푗] = 휎
2
푙 + 휎
2
푗 − 2휎푙푗 .
Thus, equation (5) can be represented as
푃푖푗 = Φ
(
푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)
휎
)
, (6)
where Φ(⋅) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher, Louviere and Swait
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(1999) provide empirical evidence that a linear speciﬁcation of the function 푤(⋅) leads to
good predictions in its middle ranges. Therefore, in the case of the simple model that
relates utilities and choice probabilities to the attributes only (see Section 5.1), one posits
푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘푎푘푗 + 휀푖푗, (7)
where 푐푖 represents an individual-speciﬁc constant, 푎푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the attributes of
the alternative, and 훽푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the parameters to be estimated. These parame-
ters can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes.
One obtains the following expression representing the diﬀerence in utility of individual 푖
between alternative 푗 and status quo,
Δ푉푖푗 = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘Δ푎푘푗 + 훽푝Δ푝푗 + 휑푖푗, (8)
where Δ푎푘푗 = 푎푘푗 − 푎푙푗, Δ푝푗 = 푝푗 − 푝푙, 푐푖 = 푐푖푙− 푐푖푗, and 휑푖푗 = 휀푖푙− 휀푖푗 for each 푗 ∕= 푙. The
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes 푚 and 푛 is given by
MRS푚,푛 = −
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푎푛
. (9)
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute 푎푚 can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context,
the income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]5:
MWTP(푎푚) =
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푝푗
. (10)
For econometric inference, it is important to recall that the same individual makes
several choices. The two-way random-eﬀect speciﬁcation takes this into account with 휑푖푗 =
5By Roy’s Identity, 푥푖푗 = −
∂푣(⋅)/∂푝푗
∂푣(⋅)/∂푦푖
, the (uncompensated) demand of individual 푖 for commodity 푗
corresponds to the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to price
푝푗 and income 푦푖. If one alternative is chosen, then the optimal quantity demanded is equal to one, i.e.
푥푖푗 = 1. Therefore, Roy’s Identity yields
∂푣
∂푦푖
= − ∂푣
∂푝푗
, i.e. the marginal utility of income is equal to the
negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price.
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휇푖+휂푖푗 , where 휇푖 denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across
the choice alternatives. The terms 휇푖 and 휂푖푗 are assumed uncorrelated with the product
attributes (푎푖1, . . . , 푎푖퐾) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit
model, 휎휂 = 1. Hence Var[휑푖푗 ] = 휎
2
휂 + 휎
2
휇 = 1 + 휎
2
휇 and Corr[휑푖푗, 휑푖푙] =
휎2휇
1+휎2휇
=: 휌. The
parameter 휌 indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated
with each other, or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by
individual-speciﬁc error term. The random-eﬀects speciﬁcation is justiﬁed if 휌 is high and
signiﬁcant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g.
income group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted
with the product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model
speciﬁcation which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses
1 and 2 in Section 5.2. By means of a 푡 test we can investigate whether the diﬀerences in
marginal WTP values between diﬀerent socioeconomic groups are statistically signiﬁcant.
The computation of the variance of the marginal WTP values is performed by the delta
method, cf. Hole (2007)6.
3.2 Experimental Design
A representative telephone survey with 979 respondents was conducted in the fall of 2008.
Prior to the survey, the attributes and their levels used to deﬁne ’income redistribution’
had been checked in two pretests for their relevance. Attributes form four groups (see
Table 1).
6The estimate of the variance is given by
Var
[
−
훽ˆ푘
훽ˆ푝
]
=
⎡
⎣∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푘
⎤
⎦
2
Var[훽ˆ푘] +
⎡
⎣∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푝
⎤
⎦
2
Var[훽ˆ푝]− 2
∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푘
∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푝
Cov[훽ˆ푘, 훽ˆ푝]
=
1
훽ˆ2푝
Var[훽ˆ푘] +
훽ˆ2푘
훽ˆ4푝
Var[훽ˆ푝] + 2
훽ˆ푘
훽ˆ3푝
Cov[훽ˆ푘, 훽ˆ푝]
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
∙ Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
∙ Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
∙ Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
∙ People with Ill Health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
∙ Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
∙ Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on ﬁve types of recipients (viz.
the working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and
people with ill health);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on three groups (viz. Swiss
citizens, western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, deﬁned as a share of GDP;
4. Personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible sce-
narios that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios deﬁne the 푛 rows of the
observation matrix 푋 , with associated covariance matrix Ω = 휎2 (푋 ′푋)−1 of parameters
훽 to be estimated. So-called 퐷-eﬃcient design calls for the minimization of the geometric
mean of the eigenvalues of Ω,
퐷 eﬃciency =
(
∣Ω∣
1
퐾
)−1
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where 퐾 denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the num-
ber of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split into ﬁve groups. One alternative
was included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices
per respondent.
In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set
and made in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the
attributes and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the graphical representation
of the status quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3).
4 Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics
too little right amount too much total valid answers missing
Income group, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
< CHF 2000 63 35 100 56 16 9 179 100 13
CHF 2000 - 3999 58 32 94 53 27 15 179 100 14
CHF 4000 - 5999 141 43 149 45 39 12 329 100 15
≥CHF 6000 79 37 118 56 14 7 211 100 10
Missing 11 16 1 28
Total answers 352 38 477 52 97 10 926 53
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 2: Answers to the question ”Do you think that the government is spending too much,
too little or about the right amount on welfare?”, by income group
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-
speaking part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent
are born in the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income be-
low CHF 2,000 and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reﬂecting the structure of the Swiss
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yes no total valid answers missing
Income group, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No.
< CHF 2000 78 42 108 58 186 100 6
CHF 2000 - 3999 112 59 77 41 189 100 4
CHF 4000 - 5999 124 37 212 63 336 100 8
≥CHF 6000 90 42 122 58 212 100 9
Missing 13 16 29
Total answers 417 45 535 55 952 27
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 3: Answers to the question ”Do you agree with the following statement: ’By in-
creasing the income tax rates for rich families and ﬁnancially supporting poor families,
the government should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?”, by
income group
population. However, only 1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
38 percent of the respondents stated that the current level of social beneﬁts was too
low, 10 percent stated that it was too high, and 52 percent found it exactly right [see
Table 2]. On the other hand, 45 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, ’By
increasing the income tax rates for rich families and ﬁnancially supporting poor families,
the government should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’, while
55 percent disagreed [see Table 3].
The distribution of answers over income groups of the respondents is obviously in
contradiction with the RRMR model. For instance, 35% of respondents with monthly
incomes below CHF 2,000 (the ’poor’) deem the current amount of social beneﬁts too
low, but this holds true for even 37% of those with incomes above CHF 6,000 (the ’rich’)
[see Table 2]. Similarly, the percentage of those ﬁnding the current size of the welfare
state excessive is 9% among the ’poor’ but only 7% among the ’rich’. Moreover, the
share of those supporting a reduction of the income gap by public redistribution is 42%
both among the ’rich’ and the ’poor’ [see Table 3]. Obviously, beliefs do not correlate
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yes no total valid answers missing
Income classes, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No.
insurance 164 33 339 67 503 100 10
inequality reduction 219 55 181 45 400 100 13
Missing 34 15 49
Total answers 417 45 535 55 952 27
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 4: Answers to the questions ”Do you agree with the following statement: ’By in-
creasing the income tax rates for rich families and ﬁnancially supporting poor families,
the government should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?” and
”What is your main motive for redistribution: insurance or inequality reduction?”
with income. On the other hand, they may reﬂect inequality aversion. These ﬁndings
motivate examining explanations of the demand for income redistribution based on beliefs
and inequality aversion. However, as noted in Section 2.1, inequality aversion could be due
to risk aversion in front of the ’veil of ignorance’. Indeed, 56 percent of the respondents
state ’insurance’ as their main motive for redistribution, compared to 44 percent of those
with the ’inequality reduction’ motive [see Table 4]. Attitudes clearly diﬀer between the
two groups, too. Only one-third of respondents with the ’insurance’ motivation support
the idea of inequality reduction to be provided by government, compared to 55% of those
with the ’inequality reduction’ motivation. In sum, ’true’ inequality aversion in the sense
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) may well be relevant, at least in the present sample.
4.2 Respondents’ Choice Behavior
There is a total of 979⋅8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which not quite 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo [see Table 5]. There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes
in the experiment may not have been suﬃciently spaced apart to make respondents switch.
Second, some attributes (e.g. beneﬁts going to the unemployed; see Table 7), may not have
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been important enough to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making
because the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However,
there may simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making
situations, as suggested by the large negative constant in Table 7. Nonetheless, only 21
percent of respondents never opted for an alternative [see Table 5]. Conversely, almost 80
percent departed from the status quo at least once.
Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 5: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 6: Distribution of the number of chosen alternatives per respondent
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Simple Model: Product Attributes Only
Estimation of equation (8) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of the
indirect utility function with regard to the GDP share of redistribution REDIST. More-
over, the fact that uses and types of beneﬁciaries add up to 100 percent needs to be taken
into account [see Table 1]. In order to avoid perfect collinearity, PENS (Pensioners) and
OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
Δ푉 = 푐0 + 훽1W POOR+ 훽2UNEMP+ 훽3ILL + 훽4FAM+
+훾1SWISS + 훾2WEU FOR+ (11)
+훿1REDIST+ 훿2REDIST
2 + 휂TAX + 휑
Estimation of a few of the 5 ⋅ 3 = 15 speciﬁcations with alternative exclusions produced
results similar to those displayed in Table 7. Speciﬁcally, they agree in that alternatives
with additional redistribution are chosen with a lower probability [for details with regard
to ’slices’ of the pie, see Neustadt and Zweifel (2010)]. Also, note the sizeable and highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the price attribute TAX, which is important for the estimation of
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) values [see eq. (10)]. For redistribution, the MWTP
value is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂Δ푉/∂REDIST
∂Δ푉/∂TAX
= −
훿1 + 2훿2REDIST
휂
(12)
This amounts to -0.25 percentage points of income share per additional percentage point of
GDP devoted to redistribution in excess of the status quo. Evaluated at the mean personal
income of the sample, this equals CHF -11.78 per month. However, this ﬁgure is dwarfed
by the compensation one would have to pay respondents to depart from the status quo,
amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their monthly income, or 5.27 percent of their
annual income [see the large negative constant in Table 7].
Equation (12) serves as the basis for checking the sustainability of the welfare state.
Construction of the (quadratic) WTP function yields a maximum (with MWTP=0) at
19
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. err. 푧 푃 > ∣푧∣ Marg. eﬀ.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
휒2(0) 108.87
Prob > 휒2 0.000
휎푢 0.41610
휌 0.14759
Table 7: Random eﬀects probit estimates for the simple model
21.05% of GDP, deﬁnitely below the current value of 25%. Therefore, the Swiss welfare
state can be said to be too big in the light of average citizens’ preferences.
5.2 Extended Model: Preference Heterogeneity
5.2.1 Ex-Ante Evaluation of the Current Level of Social Beneﬁts and Prefer-
ences for Redistribution
The simple model is now extended by one attitudinal variable at a time. The ﬁrst is respon-
dents’ ex-ante evaluation of the curent level of social beneﬁts [SB, see Table 2]. The three
levels of SB are represented by two dummy variables, SB TOOHI and SB TOOLOW.
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For instance, the latter is deﬁned as
SB TOOLOW =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if the current level of beneﬁts is deemed too low0 otherwise.
The reference category is SB RIGHT, indicating that the respondent deemed social ben-
eﬁts to have the right size. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with attitude,
eg. (11) is modiﬁed to also contain interaction terms involving the attitudinal variables,
resulting in
Δ푉 ′ = 푐′0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′
1SB TOOLOW + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′
2REDIST++훼
′
3REDIST
2 + . . .
+휆′2REDIST ⋅ SB TOOLOW + 휆
′
3REDIST
2 ⋅ SB TOOLOW + . . . (13)
+휆′4REDIST ⋅ SB TOOHI+ 휆
′
5REDIST
2 ⋅ SB TOOHI+ 휑′.
exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
Social beneﬁts too high (Group A) - -0.55946 -26.75 16.70 ***
The right amount (Group B) ≈0 -0.41789 -19.61 8.34 ***
Social beneﬁts too low (Group C) + 0.05487 2.47 8.09
Note: *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 8: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with ex-ante evaluation of the current level of
social beneﬁts
Hypothesis 1(A) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative
if the currently provided level of social beneﬁts is considered too high. It is conﬁrmed,
with the MWTP for one percentage point increase of the total amount of redistribution
being a negative CHF -26.75 [see Table 8]. Hypothesis 1(C), stating that the demand for
redistribution should be positive if the level of social beneﬁts is considered insuﬃcient,
ﬁnds some empirical support by a positive but insigniﬁcant MWTP value of CHF 2.47.
However, Hypothesis 1(B), predicting the demand for redistribution to be negative but
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close to zero for individuals who deem the current level of beneﬁts just suﬃcient, cannot
be conﬁrmed. In fact, the average respondent in this group exhibits a signiﬁcantly negative
MWTP for redistribution of CHF -19.61 per month. A 푡 test indicates that the diﬀerence in
MWTP values between respondent groups A and B is not signiﬁcant, again contradicting
Hypothesis 1(B).
As a check on the sustainability of the welfare state in the face of preference hetero-
geneity, group-speciﬁc WTP functions are constructed. Group A is found to have their
maximum WTP at a GDP share of 15.89% devoted to redistribution. The values of Groups
B and C are 18.45% and 25.52% of GDP, respectively. Therefore, attitudes with regard to
the amount of social beneﬁts do go along with heterogeneous preferences with regard to
income redistribution. These discrepancies point to sharp conﬂicts of interest in the event
that the amount of redistribution were to be reduced to the value preferred by the average
citizen.
5.2.2 Assessment of the Government’s Role in Dealing with Inequality and
Preferences for Redistribution
Next, the simple model is extended by including the dummy variable GOV REDUCE
(=1 if the respondent thinks that the government should reduce the income gap between
the rich and the poor, =0 otherwise) as well as its interactions with the attributes. Thus,
eq. (11) is modiﬁed to read,
Δ푉 ′′ = 푐′′0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′
1GOV REDUCE+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훼
′′
2REDIST+
+훼′′3REDIST
2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휅′′2REDIST ⋅GOV REDUCE+ (14)
+휅′′3REDIST
2 ⋅GOV REDUCE+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 휑′′
Hypothesis 2(a) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative
if a respondent believes that the government should not reduce the income gap between
the rich and the poor. It is conﬁrmed because MWTP in Group (a) is CHF -16.68 and
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exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
should not reduce (Group a) - -0.34515 -16.68 6.35 ***
should reduce (Group b) + -0.08417 -3.63 9.25
Note: *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with the assessment whether the government
should reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor
statistically signiﬁcant. Hypothesis 2(b) with its prediction for MWTP to be positive if a
respondent wants the government to reduce the income gap cannot be conﬁrmed. If at all,
MWTP is negative in Group (b) (but lacks statistical signiﬁcance).
Thus, individuals who stated support for inequality reduction by the government seem
to exhibit inconsistent behavior by having a negative willingness to pay for this reduction.
However, the framing of the question, ”Do you agree with the following statement: ’By
increasing the income tax rates for rich families and ﬁnancially supporting poor families,
the government should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?” did
not evoke the trade-oﬀ between the reduction of the income gap and the respondent’s own
income. By way of contrast, the WTP values come from a Discrete Choice Experiment
(DCE), where the budget restriction is inevitably present.
Addressing the sustainability issue once more, recall that the average respondent would
prefer a share of GDP devoted to redistribution of 21% rather than the current value
of 25%. However, construction of the group-speciﬁc WTP functions indicates that the
optimal values of REDIST are again somewhat apart, with 19.21% of GDP for Group (a)
and 24.09% for Group (b), respectively. Therefore, demand for income redistribution as
measured by this DCE, while below the amount provided by the government, once more
diﬀers importantly between subpopulations, rendering a reform of the Swiss welfare state
diﬃcult.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution through
a Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on a simple model that relates
choices to the attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen would have to be
paid a compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.25 percent of monthly
income) for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In
addition, a very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another
63 percent of monthly income.
Such an experiment also permits to test several hypotheses concerning the determi-
nants of the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side inﬂuences. In
particular, Hypothesis 1 states that it is negative (close to zero) among citizens who think
that public welfare currently provided welfare is excessive (suﬃcient). An extended model
that includes the pertinent attitudinal variable as a regressor yields conﬁrming evidence for
the ’excessive’ component; however, the ’suﬃcient’ component is also related to a negative
WTP value, contradicting the hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 predicts that citizens who do (not)
want government to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor exhibit positive
(negative) WTP for redistribution. Here, the extended version of the model supports the
’not’ component of the hypothesis whereas those in favor of closing the gap fail to exhibit
a positive WTP value. The major ﬁnding of the paper, however, is that estimated average
WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP devoted to redistribution, clearly below the current
value of 25%. Moreover, this value diﬀers importantly depending on attitudes toward the
desirable amount of redistribution and the government’s role in dealing with inequality.
Thus, there is reason for concern with regard to the sustainability of the Swiss welfare
state.
The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, several
behavioral explanations of the demand for redistribution (risk aversion, other beliefs, re-
ligiosity) were not tested. However, recent contributions to the ﬁeld show that up to 90
percent of cross-country diﬀerences in public spending can be related to institutional and
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behavioral factors [see e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Akkoyunlu et al. (2009)]. Thus,
future work should be devoted to ﬁnd out whether these factors also inﬂuence stated WTP
for redistribution. Second, the status quo bias found in this paper calls for more detailed
analysis. To the extent that it reﬂects risk aversion, it should induce demand for redistri-
bution - contrary to the results presented here. Finally, the evidence only relates to a point
of time in one country and thus may be subject to transitory shocks and country-speciﬁc
inﬂuences. Still, by appealing to citizens’ stated preferences, the present contribution sheds
some light on the question whether a welfare state laying claim to one quarter of the GDP
is sustainable.
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A Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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